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THE GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE RIVER BASIN 
AGREEMENT: WHAT HAPPENS IN THE GREAT 
LAKES WON’T STAY IN THE GREAT LAKES 
Kelly Kane 
This article provides a discussion of the current protections provided 
for the Great Lakes, and calls for an international binding agreement to 
ensure their continued protection. All past agreements between the 
United States and Canada to protect the Lakes have been purely good 
faith, and have no binding effect on the parties. The Great Lakes states 
and provinces have committed themselves to a good-faith agreement that 
bans all major withdrawals or diversions, subject to three exceptions. 
This Agreement has no legally binding effect on the states and provinces. 
The states, however, have created a legally binding Compact that does 
not include the Great Lakes provinces. The Great Lakes states have the 
power to make decisions regarding major withdrawals or diversions of 
Great Lakes water without the consent of the provinces. Although the 
current protections are morally binding, they will not provide enough 
protection for the Lakes given the increased concerns over water quality 
and quantity issues across the world. The federal governments of the 
United States and Canada should enter into a legally binding agreement 
to ensure the long-lasting enjoyment and protection of the Lakes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Great Lakes-St. Lawrence basin is one of the most colossal 
systems of fresh water in the world. Sitting in the heart of North 
America, the Great Lakes contain about 6 quadrillion gallons of fresh 
water,1 amounting to 84 percent of North America’s fresh water, and 21 
percent of fresh water in the world.2 Their shorelines stretch over 10,000 
miles, and contain nearly 35,000 inlands.3 The Great Lakes are more than 
a supply of freshwater; they provide astonishing scenic, recreational, and 
economic benefits to residents of the United States and Canada and to 
visitors from across the globe.4
“The traditional view [that] the Great Lakes are an endless source of 
[fresh] water” is not a sustainable one.5 Although the Great Lakes may 
seem like an endless resource, less than one percent of Great Lakes water 
is “renew[ed] through precipitation, surface water runoff, and 
groundwater recharge.”6 With the increasing scarcity of fresh water, 
pressure has built to export water from the Great “Lakes for uses outside 
their watershed.”7 Two countries, eight states, two provinces, and several 
First Nations and tribes have long shared concerns about diversions and 
withdrawals of Great Lakes water to outside the watershed as demands 
 1. Great Lakes Facts and Figures, GREAT LAKES INFO. NETWORK,
http://www.great-lakes.net/lakes/ref/lakefact.html (last updated Mar. 13, 2017). 
 2. Sara R. Gosman, Water Withdrawals in Michigan, 90 MICH. B.J. 20, 20 
(2011).
 3. Mark S. Squillace, Rethinking the Great Lakes Compact, 3 (Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 07-01, 2007). 
 4. Bradley Karkkainen, Contemporary Issues in Minnesota Water Law: The 
Great Lakes Water Resources Compact and Agreement: Transboundary Normativity 
Without International Law, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 977, 1001 (2013). 
 5. Marcia Valiante, Harmonization of Great Lakes Water Management in the 
Shadow of NAFTA, 81 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 525, 527 (2004). 
 6. Gosman, supra note 2. 
 7. Joseph W. Dellapenna, Emerging Challenges to Good Governance in the 
Great Lakes: Changing Legal Regimes: Changing State Water Allocations Laws to 
Protect the Great Lakes, 24 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 9, 51 (2014). 
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for water increase.8 In an attempt to protect the Lakes, the eight Great 
Lakes states and two Great Lakes provinces entered into a good-faith 
agreement that bans all diversions and exports of Great Lakes water, 
subject to three exceptions.9 This good-faith agreement is known as The 
Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources 
Agreement (“Agreement”).10 Although the Agreement is a substantial 
step toward stronger protection of the Great Lakes, it still falls short of 
what is necessary to protect the Lakes. A balance between protecting the 
Great Lakes and helping those areas suffering from declining water 
quality and scarcity issues is needed.  
Part I of this article will briefly discuss how the United States and 
Canada have traditionally approached water management legislation, 
outline the history of Great Lakes protections, describe agreements that 
are in effect today, and discuss the enforceability of such agreements. 
Part II will outline current international and North American water crises 
and how these crises will impact the good faith protections put in place 
on the Great Lakes. Finally, Part III of this article will argue that the 
current good faith protections for the Great Lakes are not enough to 
ensure their long-lasting enjoyment and protection. Part III will also 
emphasize the need for a binding international agreement between the 
states and provinces containing sanctions for non-compliance in order to 
protect the Great Lakes given the increasing water quality and quantity 
issues arising across the world. 
 8. Ellen Kohler, Ripples in the Water: Judicial, Executive, and Legislative 
Developments Impacting Water Management in Michigan, 53 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 26–27 
(2007).
 9. Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Agreement (2005), 
http://www.glslregionalbody.org/Docs/Agreements/Great_Lakes-
St_Lawrence_River_Basin_Sustainable_Water_Resources_Agreement.pdf [hereinafter 
Great Lakes Agreement]. 
 10. Id.
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PART I: BACKGROUND 
A. Federalism and Water Management Approaches in the United 
States and Canada
The United States and Canada take similar approaches to national and 
international water management. Although federal governments have 
power over water management, they appear to leave control in the hands 
of the states and provinces.11 Because watersheds like the Great Lakes 
are managed by two-or-more states or provinces, stronger federal 
leadership is necessary to ensure consistency and long lasting protection 
of fresh water.12
In the United States, fresh water protection has used several 
“components of the constitutional federalism framework.”13 Federalism, 
“the constitutional balance of power between [two] units of 
government,” appears in two forms: vertical and horizontal.14 Vertical 
federalism is “the relationship between the federal . . . and state 
governments,” whereas horizontal federalism is the relationship between 
state governments.15 Because water resources often cross state 
boundaries, interstate water management in the United States “has been 
addressed primarily though horizontal federalism.”16 The federal 
government has typically “left protection of water . . . resources to the 
states[,] and is likely to continue to do so.”17 In the absence of 
congressional action, the states are left to manage water resources, which 
 11. See Karla Zubrycki, et al., Water Security in Canada: Responsibilities of the 
Federal Government, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Apr. 2011), 
http://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/water_security_canada.pdf; see also
Adam Reimer, U.S. Water Policy: Trends and Future Directions 7, 30 (Nat’l Agricultural 
& Rural Dev. Policy Ctr., Working Paper, 2013). 
12. See Zubrycki, supra note 11, at 7, 30; see also Reimer, supra note 11, at 28–
32.
 13. Noah Hall, Toward a New Horizontal Federalism: Interstate Water 
Management in the Great Lakes Region, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 405, 409 (2006).  
 14. Id.
 15. Id.
 16. Id. at 410. 
 17. Id.
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has traditionally been done through some form of interstate compact.18 If 
the states wish to enter binding water resource agreements with the 
Canadian government, they must do so with the consent of Congress.19
The Canadian Constitution of 1867 lays out legislative responsibilities 
for water management in Canada.20Responsibility for water management 
is divided between the federal and provincial governments.21 Much 
overlap exists between both levels of government, because the 
Constitution grants jurisdiction over the water supply to the provincial 
government, and grants jurisdiction over transboundary waters to the 
federal government.22 However, there has been an “absence of national-
level leadership” in terms of water management, which has forced 
provincial governments to “independently create[] their own water 
management policies.”23 While there is significant power available to 
both levels of government for water management, “the default position 
[to] water management in Canada [has been] provincial regulation.”24
B. Legal History of Protections Placed on the Great Lakes 
An overview of past Great Lakes protections is necessary before an 
analysis of the gaps in the existing water management system can be 
made. The Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 (“Treaty”) was the first 
attempt to curb concerns about diversions of Great Lakes water.25 The 
 18. Id.; Jessica Bielecki, Managing Resources with Interstate Compacts: A 
Perspective from the Great Lakes, 14 BUFF. ENVTL L.J. 173, 187 (2007) (“Interstate 
compact[s are] . . . formal, legally binding agreement[s] between two or more states 
regarding an interstate issue.”). 
 19. Annie Chaloux & Stéphane Paquin, Water Resource Management and North 
American Green Paradiplomacy: The Case of the Great Lakes – St. Lawrence River 
Basin 12 (Can. Res. Chair in Int’l and Comp. Pol. Econ., Working Paper No. 1, 2013). 
/60/Water%20Resource%20Management%20and%20North%20American%20Paradiplo
macy5%200.pdf. 
 20. Zubrycki et al., supra note 11, at 17.  
 21. Id. at 6. 
 22. Id. at 17. 
 23. Id. at 1. 
 24. J. Owen Saunders, Managing Water in a Federal State: The Canadian 
Experience, in FEDERAL RIVERS: MANAGING WATER IN MULTI-LAYERED POLITICAL
SYSTEMS 80 (Dustin Garrick et al. eds., 2014). 
 25. Kohler, supra note 8, at 27.  
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Treaty solely addressed boundary waters, which are lakes and rivers 
along international boundaries between the United States and Canada.26
The Treaty did not cover Lake Michigan, because it is not a boundary 
waterway, nor did it cover ground water.27 The Treaty “is still in effect 
today” between the United States and Canada, “but has been 
supplemented by . . . [several] . . . Water Quality Agreements.”28 More 
importantly, the Treaty formed the International Joint Commission 
(“IJC”), which oversees diversions of water affecting “the natural level 
or flow of boundary waters,”29 and oversees “extremely large 
diversions.”30 The IJC still exists today, and “helps anticipate, prevent, 
and resolve disputes between the two countries in an independent and 
impartial manner.”31 Further, the IJC serves as a mechanism for 
coordination between the states and provinces, and “investigat[es] 
environmental issues of mutual [concern] along the border.”32
No new protections were put in place until 1955, when the states 
entered into the Great Lakes Basin Compact (“Basin Compact”), which 
was “an attempt at regional management” of the Lakes.33 The purpose of 
the Basin Compact was to promote conservation methods of the Great 
Lakes Basin and to “maintain[] a proper balance among industrial, 
commercial, . . . residential,” and other uses of Great Lakes water.34 The 
agreement created the Great Lakes Commission, which is tasked with the 
duty of “collect[ing] data and mak[ing] water management 
recommendations” to the states.35 A major downfall of the Basin 
 26. Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary 
Waters Between the United States and Canada, Gr. Brit.-U.S., prelim. art., Jan. 11, 1909, 
36 Stat. 2448 [hereinafter Boundary Waters Treaty]. 
 27. Kohler, supra note 8, at 27. 
 28. Bielecki, supra note 18, at 177. 
 29. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 26, art. III. 
 30. Kohler, supra note 8, at 27 (stating that Article III of the Boundary Waters 
Treaty prohibited new diversions of Great Lakes Water that would “affect[] the natural 
level or flow of boundary waters.”). Article III, however, did not further define or 
quantify what the natural level or flow is. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 26, art. III. 
 31. Shared Waters: Canada – United States, ENV’T AND CLIMATE CHANGE CAN.,
http://www.ec.gc.ca/eau-water/default.asp?lang=En&n=B947BAA8-1 (last modified 
Apr. 24, 2014). 
 32. Id.
 33. Kohler, supra note 8, at 27. 
 34. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.32201, art. I (2005) (Great Lakes Basin Compact). 
 35. Kohler, supra note 8, at 27. 
2017] The Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Agreement 435
Compact is that it is not legally binding.36 Any recommendations made 
by the Commission are advisory only, and it therefore has no actual legal 
authority to enable it to protect the Lakes.37 The Basin Compact has not 
shaped the laws governing the Great Lakes’ protection, nor has it “had 
any substantive impact on water rights in the basin.”38
Thirty years after the Basin Compact came into effect, “the Great 
Lakes governors and premiers signed the Great Lakes Charter” 
(“Charter”) in 1985.39 The Charter was implemented in response to the 
threat of diversions and consumption of Great Lakes waters that would 
“have significant adverse impacts on the environment, economy, and 
welfare of the Great Lakes region.”40 The Charter “created obligations 
for consultation and collaborative review of proposed diversions,” as 
well as state management of water usage.41 It also contained a provision 
“call[ing] for the establishment and maintenance of a regional system for 
the collection of data on major water uses, diversions and consumptive 
uses” of the Great Lakes.42 The Charter established the Great Lakes St. 
Lawrence River Regional Water Use Database (“Database”), which is 
responsible for collecting data concerning the Great Lakes water use.43
The “Database has been operational since 1988[,]” and posts annual 
reports outlining consumption and diversions of the lakes.44 The 
Database will be discussed more thoroughly in Part II of this article. 
Although the Charter was a step in the right direction by requiring 
monitoring and data collection concerning water use, “it has floundered 
in implementation.”45 Like the Great Lakes Basin Compact, the Charter 
is a non-binding good-faith agreement, so compliance has been 
 36. Id.
37. Id. at 28. 
 38. Hall, supra note 13, at 423. 
 39. Kohler, supra note 8, at 28. 
 40. COUNCIL OF GREAT LAKES GOVERNORS, THE GREAT LAKES CHARTER:
PRINCIPLES FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF GREAT LAKES WATER RESOURCES 1 (Feb. 11, 
1985).
 41. Kohler, supra note 8, at 28. 
 42. GREAT LAKES COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE GREAT LAKES COMMISSION:
WATER USE DATABASE 3 (2014), http://projects.glc.org/waterusedata/ 
pdf/wateruserpt2014.pdf. 
 43. Id.
 44. Id. 
 45. Bielecki, supra note 18, at 180. 
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unpredictable.46 The information required for the Database was only 
sporadically updated until recently, and no plans for management were 
put in place.47
The following year in 1986, Congress enacted the Water Resources 
Development Act (“WRDA”) requiring Great Lakes governors to 
approve diversion proposals out of the Great Lakes Basin.48 Under the 
WRDA, every Great Lakes governor has the power to reject a proposed 
diversion.49 In a 2000 amendment, Congress included a provision in the 
WRDA “[t]o encourage the Great Lake States, in consultation with the 
Provinces of Ontario and Quebec[]” when making withdrawal 
decisions.50 The WRDA is legally binding on the states, and represents 
“Congress’[s] intent to leave Great Lakes water management to the 
states.”51 The WRDA suffers from serious limitations as “it only 
addresses diversions,” and provides no “decision-making standards” for 
approval or denial of diversions.52 These limitations made the WRDA 
susceptible to legal claims.53 Some change was necessary, as it was 
unlikely that the states and provinces in the basin would continue to 
maintain authority over fresh water management.54 A new tool for water 
management “would have to address both the Basin’s desire to retain 
authority over withdrawal decisions and any future attempts to tap into 
the Great Lakes.”55
On June 18, 2001, the governors and premiers of the Great Lakes 
states and provinces signed yet another good-faith agreement, the Great 
Lakes Charter Annex (“Annex”).56 The purpose of the Annex was to 
“bridge the gap between the Charter and the WRDA.”57 The Annex 
 46. Kohler, supra note 8, at 28. 
 47. Bielecki, supra note 18, at 180. 
 48. Kohler, supra note 8, at 28. 
 49. Hall, supra note 13, at 429. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id.
 52. Kohler, supra note 8, at 28. 




 57. Jeffrey Edstrom et al., An Approach for Identifying Improvements Under the 
Great Lakes Charter Annex 2001, 4 TOL. J. GREAT LAKES’ L. SCI. & POL’Y 335, 336 
(2002).
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builds on the Charter and creates a standard of review for both 
withdrawals and diversions.58 At the time of its inception, the Annex 
“was a breakthrough not only for the Great Lakes, but also for water 
management in general.”59 The Annex created “unprecedented 
protections” to the Lakes, “including a commitment from the [governors 
and premiers] to make all water withdrawal decisions” collectively.60 The 
Annex has set the stage for the creation of the new Agreement, which is 
the main focus of this discussion.
The Great Lakes premiers and governors recognized the shortcomings 
of the above described protections put into place over the past 100 years, 
and sought to implement legally binding agreements. The governors of 
the eight Great Lakes states and premiers of two Canadian provinces 
signed the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water 
Resources Agreement (“Agreement”) on December 13, 2005.61 The 
Agreement is “implemented in Ontario and Québec through [p]rovincial 
laws, and in the [s]tates, through the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River 
Basin Water Resources Compact” (“Compact”).62 The Agreement is a 
good-faith agreement between the Great Lakes states and provinces that 
places a ban on new or increased diversions, subject to three 
exceptions.63 The Agreement specifically instructs the states and 
provinces to “adopt and implement Measures to prohibit New or 
Increased Diversions, . . . Measures to manage and regulate Exceptions 
[to diversions] . . . [and] Measures to manage and regulate [Great Lakes 
water] Withdrawals and Consumptive Uses.”64 The Compact is a mirror 
image of the Agreement, and is legally binding on the Great Lakes 
states.65 Both the Agreement and Compact will be discussed in detail 
below.
Some scholars have argued that Great Lakes states and provinces 
should not expect to monopolize Great Lakes fresh water by 
 58. Id.
 59. Bielecki, supra note 18, at 183. 
 60. Id.
 61. Great Lakes Agreement, supra note 9. 
 62. Frequently Asked Questions, GREAT LAKES–ST. LAWRENCE RIVER WATER 
RESOURCES REGIONAL BODY 1-2 (Apr. 2007), http://www.glslregionalbody.org/Docs/ 
Misc/Frequently_Asked_Questions_4-07.pdf.
 63. Great Lakes Agreement, supra note 9, art. 201. 
 64. Id. art 200. 
 65. Kohler, supra note 8, at 29, 38. 
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implementing restrictions on diversions and consumptive uses.66
However, the Great Lakes are linked to the economic and environmental 
health of the Canadian and American regions in which they are located 
and require the utmost protection to ensure their survival.67 Although the 
states and provinces have taken several steps to ensure the fresh water of 
the Great Lakes is not diverted or consumed at an unsustainable rate, the 
current protections are still not enough. Due to the vast size and quantity 
of fresh water within the Great Lakes, they remain a prime target of 
diversion from areas experiencing drought and water quality issues.68 A 
legally enforceable international agreement is necessary to protect the 
Great Lakes from future diversions. Without a legally enforceable 
agreement, the current good faith system will fail. 
C. Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water 
Resources Agreement  
Rather than waiting for national governments to act to create 
protections for the Great Lakes, the governors of Illinois, Indiana, 
Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and 
the premiers of Ontario and Quebec, signed the Agreement.69 The 
governors and premiers recognized the gaps that still existed in the 
current system and chose to adopt another good-faith agreement in 
attempt to close the gaps.70 This “non-binding but morally compelling”
agreement requires the states and provinces to adopt and carry out 
measures that prohibit new or increased diversions of Great Lakes 
water.71 Under the Agreement, “new or increased diversions are 
prohibited, leaving to the individual parties how to address existing 
 66. Dellapenna, supra note 7, at 51–52 (“If precipitation changes from global 
climate disruption are even half as bad as current predictions, the approximately 4 percent 
of the global population that lives within the Great Lakes watershed cannot expect to 
continue to monopolize the Lakes’ waters (21 percent of the world’s available fresh water 
supply).”). 
 67. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 62, at 3.  
 68. Nathan C. Johnson, Comment: Protecting Our Water Compacts: The 
Looming Threat of Unilateral Congressional Intervention, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 875, 884 
(2010).
 69. Karkkainen, supra note 4, at 998, 1020 (2013). 
 70. Id. at 1020. 
 71. Id.
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diversions.”72 The Agreement also calls for the states and provinces to 
adopt measures to regulate exceptions to diversions, withdrawals, and 
consumptive uses.73
The Agreement defines a withdrawal as a means of taking “water 
from surface water or groundwater.”74 A withdrawal includes a 
consumptive use, which is the “portion of [the] Water Withdrawn or 
withheld from the Basin that is lost or otherwise not returned to the Basin 
due to evaporation, [or] incorporation into Products or other processes.”75
A diversion is “a transfer of Water from the Basin into another 
watershed, or from the watershed of one of the Great Lakes into that of 
another by means of transfer.”76
Under the Agreement, there are three exceptions to the prohibition on 
diversions: the straddling community exception, intra-basin transfer 
exception, and the straddling counties exception.77 The intra-basin 
transfer exception allows “the transfer of Water from the watershed of 
one . . . Lake[] [to] the watershed of another.”78 Two other exceptions to 
the ban on diversions involve communities and counties that straddle the 
surface water basin divide.79 A straddling community, which is an 
incorporated city or town whose borders lie at least partly within the 
basin, may apply for an exception to the ban on diversions.80 A 
community within a straddling county, which is a city or town “located 
outside the Basin but wholly within a County [located] partly within the 
Basin,” may apply for an exception as well.81 The straddling county 
exception allows diversions from communities technically outside of the 
basin, but is subject to additional review criteria beyond what is required 
for a straddling community exception or intra-basin transfer.82
A proposal for an exception to the prohibition on diversions must 
meet several criteria outlined in the exception standard in Article 201 of 
 72. Kohler, supra note 8, at 30. 
 73. Great Lakes Agreement, supra note 9, art. 200.  
 74. Id. art 103. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id.
 77. Id. art. 201. 
 78. Id. art. 103. 
 79. Id. art. 201. 
 80. Id.
 81. Id.
 82. Kohler, supra note 8, at 32. 
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the Agreement.83 First, the exception must not “be reasonably avoided 
through the efficient use and conservation of existing water supplies.”84
Second, the quantity of water withdrawn must be limited to reasonable 
amounts.85 Third, “All Water Withdrawn [must] be returned . . . to the 
Source Watershed less an allowance for Consumptive Use.”86 Fourth, 
there must be no significant impacts to the quantity and quality of 
water.87 Fifth, “Conservation Measures [must be used] to minimize 
Water Withdrawals or Consumptive Use.”88 Sixth, the exception must 
comply with all laws.89 The exception standard is a minimum standard, 
so parties are free to implement exception standards that are more 
restrictive than those provided for in the Agreement.90
The Agreement calls for the development of a decision-making 
standard by all parties for management of new or increased withdrawals 
and consumptive uses.91 The Agreement provides five criteria that must 
be satisfied before a withdrawal or consumptive use is approved.92 The 
decision-making standard criteria are very similar to the exception 
standard criteria, and like the exception standard, serve as a minimum 
standard.93 First, any “Water Withdrawn [must] be returned . . . to the 
Source . . . less an allowance for Consumptive Use.”94 Second, there shall 
be no significant impacts on water quality or quantity.95 Third, 
conservation measures must be implemented with respect to the way 
water is withdrawn.96 Fourth, the withdrawal must be in compliance with 
other laws and treaties.97 Lastly, an assessment of whether the proposed 
water use is reasonable must be made.98
 83. Id.






 90. Id. art. 202. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. art. 203. 
 93. Id. art. 202. 
 94. Id. art. 203. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id.
 98. Id.
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The Agreement also creates a Regional Body, which is composed of 
the governor of each state and premier of each province.99 The Regional 
Body is primarily responsible for ensuring formalized processes for 
approving or denying proposals for diversions, declaring whether the 
exception standard was met for proposals, and “[m]onitor[ing] and 
report[ing] on the implementation of [the] Agreement.”100 The Regional 
Body will not approve a proposed diversion if it finds the proposal does 
not meet the exception standard.101 The Regional Body also must “keep a 
complete public record of documents” such as proposals for diversions, 
technical reviews, comments made by the public, and declarations of 
finding.102 The Agreement emphasizes the importance of public 
participation in proposals for withdrawals and diversions, so the 
Regional Body shall allow for public participation in its decisions “[t]o 
the greatest extent possible.”103 The Agreement contains no specific 
enforcement provisions, “since it is non-binding and review by the 
Regional Body is more advisory in nature.”104
D. The Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources 
Compact 
The Agreement discussed above is implemented in the United States 
through The Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources 
Compact (“Compact”).105 The Compact legally binds the eight Great 
Lakes states and is essentially a “mirror-image” of the Agreement.106
Like the Agreement, the Compact includes requirements that each state 
create programs to manage and regulate all new or increased 
withdrawals, and also that each state create stringent restrictions on new 
or increased diversions outside the basin.107 The Compact creates The 
Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Council 
 99. Id. art. 400. 
 100. Id.
 101. See id.
 102. Id. art. 401. 
 103. Id.
 104. Kohler, supra note 8, at 39. 
 105. Id. at 29. 
 106. Karkkainen, supra note 4, at 1017. 
 107. Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact, art. 2, §§ 
2.1, 2.3, Pub. L. No. 110-342, 122 Stat. 3739, 3744 (2008) [hereinafter Compact]. 
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(“Council”), which consists of the Governors of each state that is a party 
to the Compact.108 Unlike the Regional Body created by the non-binding 
Agreement, the Council created by the Compact has authority to initiate 
enforcement actions.109 Any party, or the Council, may commence a civil 
enforcement action in the relevant state court against any person or party 
in violation of the Compact.110 Further, a person, state, or province, 
aggrieved by Council action is entitled to a hearing.111 Although the 
Compact calls for collaboration and consideration of the provinces, it 
does not legally require it.112 Essentially, the Compact gives the “Great 
Lakes states the [ability] to enforce . . . collective control over the Great 
Lakes basin.”113 This poses risks to Ontario and Quebec because they are 
unable to protect their interests in the Great Lakes through the 
Compact.114 Ontario and Quebec are not parties to it, so the states are not 
legally bound to consider their interests.115
Although the Agreement includes the provinces as parties, the 
Agreement is only in good faith and not legally binding.116 Further, 
“Quebec and Ontario represent more than 40% of the population living 
in the [Great Lakes] basin,” but the interests of the provinces are 
represented by only two of the ten decision makers.117 Under the 
Compact, Canadian interests are not legally represented at all.118 For 
Quebec and Ontario “to overcome these [obvious] weaknesses, great 
confidence in all stakeholders is required, but it is not impossible to 
achieve.”119 The confidence in all stakeholders might be shaken in the 
coming years considering the water quality and quantity issues occurring 
across the continent.120 It is remarkable to some that protection of the 
Great Lakes has taken place without international treaties specifically 
 108. Id. art. II, §§ 2.1–.2. 
 109. Kohler, supra note 8, at 38.  
 110. Id. at 39. 
 111. Id.
 112. See Compact, supra note 107, art. 1, §1, 4. 
 113. Chaloux & Paquin, supra note 19, at 14. 
 114. Id. at 15. 
 115. See id.
 116. Karkkainen, supra note 4, at 1020. 
 117. Chaloux & Paquin, supra note 19, at 15. 
 118. Id.
 119. Id.
 120. See infra Part II. 
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authorizing it.121 Considering the possible risks posed to Canadian Great 
Lakes provinces, the time to adopt a binding, international agreement 
should come sooner rather than later to protect the interests of all those
living in the Great Lakes basin. An international agreement providing for 
penalties for non-compliance would ensure the continued protection of 
the Great Lakes. More stringent safeguards seem natural given the 
progression of Great Lakes protections put in place over the past 100 
years.  
PART II: CONSUMPTION RATES OF GREAT LAKES WATER, LOCAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL WATER CRISES, AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE LAKES
A. Great Lakes Commission Report and 2014 Findings 
As discussed in Part I, the Agreement instructs the Great Lakes states 
and provinces to collect data concerning the use of fresh water from the 
basin.122 That data is then sent to the Great Lakes Commission, “which 
serves as the database repository.”123 The Great Lakes St. Lawrence 
River Regional Water Use Database (“Database”) produces annual 
reports concerning withdrawals from the Great Lakes.124 The “Database 
has been operational since 1988,” and was established as a response to a 
provision under the Great Lakes Charter.125 Because of the non-binding 
nature of the Agreement, the reporting is not required by any party, but 
compliance in reporting has been improving since the inception of the 
Database.126
In 2014, the Database reported total withdrawals from the Great 
Lakes-St. Lawrence river basin as “44,493 million gallons per day 
(“mgd”).”127 This was a five percent increase from the 42,380 mgd 
withdrawn in 2013.128 Consumptive uses in 2014 totaled 2,490 mgd, a 
seven percent increase from 2013.129 “The public water supply . . . and 
 121. Karkkainen, supra note 4, at 1021. 
 122. Great Lakes Commission, supra note 42, at 4. 
 123. Id. at 3. 
 124. Id.
 125. Id.
 126. Id. at 3–4. 
 127. Id. at 6. 
 128. Id.
 129. Id. at 9. 
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industrial [water supply] . . . were [main] contributors to the total 
consumptive use amount.”130 Although the Database represents a very 
large step in the right direction towards accountability of parties to the 
Agreement, consumption of Great Lakes water is increasing, so the 
figures provided in the Database demonstrate the need for continued and 
potentially more stringent protections. 
B. Global Water Security 
In a 2012 Global Water Security report requested by the U.S. 
Department of State, the global demand for fresh water was predicted to 
increase between now and 2040.131 The current supply of fresh water is 
incapable of keeping up with these demands.132 The report attributed the 
increased demand for fresh water to climate change, clean water scarcity, 
and mismanagement of fresh water resources.133 Specifically, the report 
predicted that over the next 10 years, countries with close ties to the 
United States located in North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia 
would experience water scarcity and quality issues.134 Water problems in 
these areas inhibit the ability to “produce food and generate energy,” 
which poses a problem for the United States as it hinders food markets 
and economic growth.135 Considering the Great Lakes comprise 21% of 
the world’s fresh water, it is likely that these countries will also turn to 
the United States for exports of fresh water to meet demands in times of 
serious shortage.136 Although the Agreement forbids exports and 
diversions of water, the pressure placed on the United States to export 
water may be greater than the moral obligation it has to the Canadian 
provinces under the Agreement. In the event areas request water from the 
Great Lakes, the Great Lakes states can approve an export of water under 
 130. Id.
 131. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, GLOBAL WATER SECURITY, 1
(2012).
 132. Id.
 133. Id. at 1, 5.  
 134. Id. at 1. 
 135. Id.
 136. See id. at 11. 
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the current regime, regardless of objections made by Quebec and 
Ontario.137
C. The Effect Drought and Climate Change on North America   
Over the next few decades, North America is expected to experience 
increased variability in precipitation and drought.138 Although some 
variability in climate change is natural, the climate now seems to be 
changing beyond the natural variability. 139 Anticipated climate change 
over the next five decades is predicted to be a result of human activities, 
such as burning fossil fuels, which causes greenhouse gas emissions.140
These increases in greenhouse gas emissions caused by human activity 
are expected to result in global warming.141 Average global temperatures 
of the ocean and air provide evidence that the earth “is warming [at rates] 
faster than at any time during the 20th century.”142 “Global mean surface 
temperatures [increased] 1.33 [degrees Fahrenheit] . . . between 1906 and 
2005, [b]ut during the past fifty years, the rate of global warming has 
nearly doubled.”143 The increases in temperature will cause sea levels to 
rise, and creates the possibility of extreme weather events such as 
droughts and floods at a more frequent and severe rate.144 In the Great 
Lakes basin, water quality is affected by climate change through high 
water temperatures, which would decrease dissolved oxygen and 
 137. Although the agreement is “morally compelling,” the parties are not legally 
bound to abide by its terms. See Karkkainen, supra note 4, at 1020; see also Kohler, 
supra note 8, at 25.  
 138. See Noah D. Hall, Interstate Water Compacts and Climate Change 
Adaptation, 5 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 237, 244 (2010); Overview of Climate 
Change in Canada, NAT. RES. CAN. http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/environment/resources/
publications/impacts-adaptation/reports/assessments/2008/ch2/10321 (last modified Nov. 
10, 2015). 
 139. See Hall, supra note 138, at 244.  
 140. Global Warming is Human Caused, NAT’L WILDLIFE FED’N,
https://www.nwf.org/Wildlife/Threats-to-Wildlife/Global-Warming/Global-Warming-is-
Human-Caused.aspx (last visited Nov. 4, 2016). 
 141. Id.
 142. Hall, supra note 138, at 243. 
 143. Id.
 144. See Climate Impacts on Water Resources, EPA, 
http://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/impacts/water.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2016). 
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increase the presence of algae and bacteria, making water undrinkable.145
The anticipated climate change will place more pressure on the Great 
Lakes states to provide diversions and exports of fresh water to areas 
across North America experiencing water quantity and quality issues.146
The western and southwestern states in particular are facing water 
supply issues.147 Over the next century, they are predicted to experience 
less precipitation and generally a warmer climate.148 This warmer climate 
will reduce snowpack, which is the accumulation of snow in the North 
American Mountains.149 Snowpack is a primary source of water for 
western states in the spring and summer; when the snowpack melts 
earlier than the spring and summer months when water needs are 
greatest, fresh water shortages will occur more frequently.150 This 
reduced snowpack decreases the availability of fresh water for Colorado 
River basin states, including California.151
Unlike the Western states, the Northeast and Midwest states have 
been experiencing increased rainfall, likely caused by rising global 
temperature, because warmer air holds more moisture and results in 
heavier precipitation.152 Areas experiencing increased precipitation will 
experience more problems with water quality.153 Heavy rainfall “can 
increase the amount of runoff into rivers and lakes, washing sediment, 
nutrients, pollutants, trash, animal waste, and other materials into water 
supplies, making them unusable, unsafe, or in need of water 
treatment.”154
 145. See Global Warming and the Great Lakes, NAT’L WILDLIFE FOUND., 
https://www.nwf.org/wildlife/threats-to-wildlife/global-warming/effects-on-wildlife-and-
habitat/great-lakes.aspx (Last visited Mar. 20, 2017). 
 146. See Int’l Joint Comm’n, Climate Change and Water Quality in the Great 
Lakes Basin, at 104 (Aug. 2003), http://www.ijc.org/files/publications/C210.pdf. 
 147. See Climate Impacts on Water Resources, supra note 144. 
 148. Hall, supra note 138, at 244. 
 149. Id. at 245. 
 150. Id.
 151. Id.
 152. See Global Warming and Floods, NATIONAL WILDLIFE FOUNDATION,
https://www.nwf.org/Wildlife/Threats-to-Wildlife/Global-Warming/Global-Warming-is-
Causing-Extreme-Weather/Floods.aspx (last visited Mar. 20, 2017). 
 153. Climate Impacts on Water Resources, supra note 144. 
 154. Id.
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Not only are rising temperatures linked to drought and increased 
precipitation, but they also result in increased consumption of water.155
When “temperatures rise, people and animals need more water to 
maintain their health and thrive. Many important economic activities, 
like producing energy at power plants, raising livestock, and growing 
food crops, also require water.”156 As temperatures rise, the amount of 
fresh water available will decrease, but at the same time the need for 
fresh water will increase.157
The resulting negative impacts of climate change on water quantity 
and quality in North America will likely increase pressures to exploit the 
Great Lakes fresh water supply.158 Although experts have suggested 
strategies to limit the cause of climate change by cutting back on sources 
of greenhouse gases, global warming and its effects on the Great Lakes 
basin cannot be changed overnight.159 More stringent protections are 
needed to ensure water quality and scarcity issues do not cause excessive 
diversions and exports of Great Lakes water.   
D. Waukesha Radium Contamination and Diversion Proposal 
The first major test of the strength of the Agreement and Compact 
arose when the City of Waukesha, Wisconsin, recently applied for a 
diversion of Lake Michigan water in May 2010.160 This application arose 




 158. Keith Matheny, Shipping Great Lakes Water? That’s California Dreaming,
DET. FREE PRESS (Apr. 19, 2015, 2:28 PM), http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/ 
2015/04/19/michigan-great-lakes-water/25965121/. 
 159. See generally Comm’n for Envtl. Cooperation, Strategic Plan of the 
Commission for Environmental Cooperation 2015-2020, (July 15, 2015), 
http://www.cec.org/sites/default/files/documents/strategic_plans/strategic_plan_2015_20
20.pdf. The Commission for Environmental Cooperation is a collaborative partnership 
between Canada, Mexico, and the United States. Id. at 1. The commission created a 
strategic plan that prioritizes greenhouse gas emission mitigation actions, waste 
management programs, promotion of environmentally friendly products, and reducing 
toxicity and quantity of waste and increase recycling. Id. at 7–8. 
 160. Monica Davey, Waukesha Plan for Lake Michigan Water Raises Worries,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/26/us/waukesha-plan-for-
lake-michigan-water-raises-worries.html?_r=0. 
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permanent solution to radium contamination in the local water supply by 
2018.161 Waukesha is “located 17 miles west of Lake Michigan, and 
[about] 1.5 miles” outside the lake’s natural basin.162 The city sought the 
straddling counties exception to the Agreement.163 The city proposed to 
divert 10.1 million gallons per day from Lake Michigan via pipeline.164
In May 2016, representatives from Ontario and Quebec gave conditional 
approval to the proposed diversion,165 and on June 21, 2016, the Compact 
Council approved the diversion.166
While Ontario and Quebec had the opportunity to voice their opinions 
regarding the proposed diversion and ultimately gave conditional 
approval of the diversion in May 2016,167 the provinces were not a part of 
the final approval vote.168 If the premiers of Ontario did not agree to the 
proposal, there still would have been potential for the diversion to occur, 
because the states are not legally bound to consider the province’s 
vote.169 Proposals like Waukesha’s will likely not be the last with water 
being such a limited, valuable resource. “If national drought conditions 
and the economic and political pressures that follow worsen over time, 
some Midwestern water experts fear that the lakes’ existing protections 
might ultimately weaken.”170 Opponents of the diversion argue this 
diversion sets a “dangerous precedent,” especially given the severe water 
 161. Waukesha, Wisconsin Diversion Application, WIS. DEP’T OF NAT. RES. (Jan. 
2016), http://dnr.wi.gov/topic/waterUse/documents/waukesha/
WaukeshaDiversionOverview.pdf. 
 162. Frequently Asked Questions, WAUKESHA WATER UTIL.,
http://www.waukesha-water.com/faqH5.html (last updated June 4, 2015). 
 163. See Davey, supra note 160. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Don Behm, Great Lakes Mayors Oppose Waukesha Diversion, MILWAUKEE 
J. SENTINEL (Aug. 22, 2016, 11:11 PM), http://www.jsonline.com/story/news/local/ 
waukesha/2016/08/22/great-lakes-mayors-oppose-waukesha-diversion/89101194/. 
 166. City of Waukesha Water Diversion Application, WIS. DEP’T OF NAT. RES.,
http://dnr.wi.gov/topic/wateruse/waukeshadiversionapp.html (last revised June 21, 2016). 
 167. Behm, supra note 165. 
 168. Diana Mehta, Canadians Invited to Comment on US City’s Request to Draw 
Great Lakes Water, GLOBALNEWS (Mar. 6, 2016, 11:56 AM), 
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 169. Chaloux & Paquin, supra note 19, at 15.  
 170. See Davey, supra note 160. 
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shortages occurring in the western states.171 Other water crises within the 
basin in the United States pose a threat to the Canadian interests of the 
compact as well. 
E. Flint Water Crisis 
On January 5, 2016, Michigan governor Rick Snyder declared a state 
of emergency after water was sourced from the Flint River, resulting in 
lead contamination of drinking water in Flint, Michigan.172 The lead 
contamination arose in April 2014, when the city switched its water 
source from Lake Huron to the Flint River.173 The switch was motivated 
by the city of Flint’s financial woes, and was implemented after a state-
appointed emergency manager recommended using Flint River water to 
cut costs.174 The switch would have saved Flint an estimated “5 million 
[USD] while [the city] awaited the construction of a new pipeline to 
Lake Huron.”175 The plan received little evaluation for its technical 
feasibility, and Michigan government officials were slow to react to 
citizens’ complaints about the contaminated water.176 Shortly following 
the switch, residents complained of the strange taste, color, and smell 
emitting from the water.177 In the summer of 2014, the city issued several 
boil water advisories after the switch was made to the Flint River.178 Two 
research studies conducted in the fall of 2015 determined the new water 
source corroded aging water pipes, which leached lead into the water 
system.179 The Michigan Department of Environmental Quality failed to 
 171. Mehta, supra note 168. 
 172. Paul Egan, Snyder Declares Emergency as Feds Probe Flint Water, DET.
FREE PRESS (Jan. 15, 2016, 10:42 AM), http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/ 
michigan/2016/01/05/us-attorneys-office-investigating-lead-flint-water/78303960/. 
 173. Codi Kozacek, Flint’s Contaminated Drinking Water is Third Water Threat 
for Michigan Governor, CIRCLE OF BLUE (Jan. 11, 2016), 
http://www.circleofblue.org/2016/great-lakes/flints-contaminated-drinking-water-is-third-
water-threat-for-michigan-governor/. 
 174. Egan, supra note 172. 
 175. Kozacek, supra note 173. 
 176. Id.
 177. Ralph Ellis & Sara Ganim, Flint Learns of Legionnaires’ Disease Spike as 
Water Crisis Continues, CNN (Jan. 13, 2016, 8:13 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/ 
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require corrosion control chemicals necessary to prevent corrosion in the 
drinking water, which caused lead to leach from pipes into local drinking 
water.180 The lead in the water likely was the cause of the spikes in led 
levels in the blood of Flint children.181 Flint Mayor Weaver stated the 
costs to reverse the damage in terms of infrastructure and improving 
residents’ health, could be up to $1.5 billion.182 As a temporary solution 
to the water crisis in Flint, members of the Michigan National guard 
were deployed to distribute bottles of water and water filters for 
residents.183
The Flint water crisis has received national attention, which has 
sparked nationwide water quality concerns.184 Sebring, Ohio, for 
example, discovered “unsafe levels of lead in the town’s drinking water” 
in August 2015 because of lead pipes.185 Residents of St. Joseph, 
Louisiana, reported that for the past ten years their drinking water has 
been brown or yellow and smelled of metal.186 Given this increase in 
national concern over water quality, further pressure will likely be placed 
on the Great Lakes states to send water to areas in need.  
If an increased diversion is needed to repair the major damage done to 
the Flint water system or other U.S. cities with contaminated drinking 
water, the voice of Canadian premiers may be overpowered by those of 
the state governors. The Compact does not require consent of the 
Canadian provinces, so governors may choose to disregard the opinions 
of the Canadian premiers in the wake of such severe water crises. 
Although the need is legitimate and the threat of lead poisoning is 
 180. Paul Egan, State’s Handling of Flint Water Samples Delayed Action, DET.
FREE PRESS (Dec. 23, 2016, 11:13 PM), http://www.freep.com/story/news/politics/ 
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01/07/governor-meet-morning-flint-mayor/78402190/. 
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serious, other solutions, such as replacing lead pipes, should be 
implemented rather than relying on the limited fresh water supply in the 
Great Lakes. 
PART III: ARGUMENT AND SOLUTION
The Agreement as it stands today is not enough protection for the 
Great Lakes. Specifically, the Agreement does not provide enough 
protection for the interests of the Canadian provinces because they are 
not members to the Compact. A legally binding, international agreement 
should be put in place to protect the interests of all parties to the basin. 
Although the Great Lakes states have committed themselves morally to 
the Agreement, it may not be enough to withstand the pressures for 
diversions given the rise in water shortages and water quality issues in 
the United States.  
As water quality and quantity issues are becoming more prevalent, 
Canada is becoming “less and less insulated from the geopolitical 
instability linked to extreme drought and floods.”187 Canadians have been 
“lulled into a myth of abundance” of fresh water, and beliefs that the 
Great Lakes supply of fresh water will last forever will lead to more 
water crises.188 Canadian water risk literacy appears to be low as well; 
although the World Economic Forum has listed water crises as the top 
five global risks, 81% of Canadians do not believe they are susceptible to 
droughts.189 Rather than lying in wait for a crisis to occur, now is the time 
for Canadians to demand more protection of their interests in the Great 
Lakes from the federal government.190 Although protections for the Great 
Lakes have progressed over the past 100 years, there is still no agreement 
that binds both the United States and Canada. A legally binding 
international agreement seems to be the most logical step towards 
protecting the Great Lakes from excessive diversions.  
As it currently stands, the Compact requires only consultation or 
cooperation with the provinces, but it is not legally bound to follow their 
 187. Dustin Garrick, What the California Drought Means for Canadians, THE 
GLOBE AND MAIL (Apr. 7, 2015, 1:42 PM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-
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input.191 With the increased water crises, this good faith obligation 
imposed by the Agreement will fail. A binding agreement is especially 
important considering the disparity in representation of interests of the 
parties to the Agreement because 40% of the basin population resides in 
Ontario and Quebec.192 Although a binding agreement alone will not 
completely compensate for this under representation, it still overcomes 
some of the obvious weaknesses associated with a good-faith agreement.
The Agreement imposes no legal consequences on the states for 
failing to consider the objections of the Great Lakes premiers.193 An 
international agreement that imposes restrictions and penalties to parties 
who do not comply will ensure the continued protection of the Great 
Lakes. Although failing to comply with the Agreement would cause 
hardship to the relationship between the provinces and states and hinder 
trust that has been built for hundreds of years, more serious financial 
penalties would serve as even greater incentives to abide by the 
Agreement. With the current regime, the states can approve a proposed 
diversion to areas like Flint or Waukesha, without consent of the 
provinces.194 Imposing legally binding obligations would ensure 
Canadian interests in the Great Lakes remain a priority. If the states 
approved a diversion without the consent of the provinces, a new regime 
should require penalties. 
Now is the time for Canadians living within the Great Lakes basin to 
call upon the federal government to form a legally binding agreement. 
Although the Great Lakes protections have come a long way since the 
initial Boundary Waters Treaty, there is room for improvement. Current 
predictions support the finding that water scarcity issues are not going to 
end overnight. Waiting until water scarcity and quality issues worsen 
will only increase the pressure on the states to allow for new or increased 
diversions.   
 191. Compact, supra note 107, art. 1 §1.  
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 193. See Great Lakes Agreement, supra note 9; see also Chaloux & Paquin, supra
note 19, at 15. 
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CONCLUSION
In sum, the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Agreement 
represents a substantial step towards the commitment between the Great 
Lakes states and provinces to sustainable water use and protection of the 
Great Lakes. However, this good-faith agreement will likely fail in the 
midst of water shortages and water quality issues in the United States and 
in foreign countries with strong ties to the United States. These shortages 
will place increased pressure on state governments to allow exceptions to 
the ban on diversions deprived of the consent of Canadian premiers. 
Without an internationally binding agreement, there will be no sanctions 
on the Great Lakes states for taking part in such diversions sans 
Canadian consent. Although diverting water without the blessing of the 
Canadian premiers involved in the Compact would place serious harm on 
the relationship between the United States and Canada, the Great Lakes 
states may see no other option but to disregard the Agreement in the 
wake of a water crisis. The Great Lakes are an extraordinary natural 
resource that requires legally enforceable protections. A legally binding 
international agreement is needed to preserve the interests of Canadians 
in the Great Lakes basin. 
